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Abstract—Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) local and
remote attestation mechanisms enable an enclave to attest its
identity (i.e., the enclave measurement, which is the cryptographic
hash of its initial code and data) to an enclave. To verify that
the attested identity is trusted, one enclave usually includes
the measurement of the enclave it trusts into its initial data
in advance assuming no trusted third parties are available
during runtime to provide this piece of information. However,
when mutual trust between these two enclaves is required, it is
infeasible to simultaneously include into their own initial data the
other’s measurements respectively as any change to the initial
data will change their measurements, making the previously
included measurements invalid. In this paper, we propose MAGE,
a framework enabling a group of enclaves to mutually attest each
other without trusted third parties. Particularly, we introduce a
technique to instrument these enclaves so that each of them could
derive the others’ measurements using information solely from
its own initial data. We also provide a prototype implementation
based on Intel SGX SDK, to facilitate enclave developers to adopt
this technique.
I. INTRODUCTION
As storage and computation outsourcing to clouds be-
come more and more prevalent, cautious users and security
researchers raise questions on whether the cloud providers
could keep their data private and execute their applications
as expected. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer
solutions to these concerns. A TEE is a secure component of a
processor that protects the confidentiality and integrity of the
code and data it executes upon. Examples of TEEs include Intel
Software Guard Extensions (SGX), AMD Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV), and ARM TrustZone. Among them,
Intel SGX, due to its convenient development and deployment
model, is widely considered the most promising TEE solution,
drawing attention from both industry and academia since its
introduction [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10],
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21].
Commercial clouds, such as Microsoft Azure [22] and Alibaba
Cloud [23] have offered SGX platforms for confidential cloud
computing. A startup called Fortanix [24] adopts SGX to
provide runtime encryption solutions.
Intel SGX provides software applications a shield execution
environment, called enclave, to execution their proprietary
code on secret data. This is achieved through a set of hardware
and microcode extensions, including a special CPU execution
mode (i.e., enclave mode), an extended memory management
unit that performs isolation during address translation, a mem-
ory encryption engine that sits between the CPU and the
memory controllers. Intel SGX assumes privileged adversaries,
such as malicious operating systems or rogue administrators.
Therefore, the enclave memory is automatically encrypted with
an encryption key known only to the CPU, and properly
isolated so that it is not accessible to even the most privileged
software. Only code inside the enclave region is able to access
the enclave memory when executed under the enclave mode.
Trusting an enclave via remote attestation. Before provision-
ing any secrets to an enclave, the enclave must be “trusted”.
This trust is established via remote attestation [25]. In the
context of attestation, the enclave is denoted the attester and
the entity that wishes to establish trust on the attester is
denoted the attestee, which could be either the user of the
enclave (i.e., a human empowered by code) or another enclave.
Any software component between them can be considered as
untrusted or even malicious. The establishment of trust can be
achieved by answering the following three questions, the first
two of which have been addressed by Intel SGX:
• Is the attester an enclave? A particular private key, called
attestation key, is used to sign the message (a data structure
called quote) the attester sends to the attestee to prove that
the producer of the message is indeed an enclave running
on an SGX platform. The attestation key is endorsed by a
root secret called root provisioning key, which is burnt into
the SGX processor during the manufacturing process, and
could only be used to sign messages produced by enclaves.
Hence, when the quote is verified to be valid, the attestee
can be assured that the attester is indeed an SGX enclave.
Intel SGX also provides another simpler mechanism, called
local attestation, to address the case when the attestee is
also an enclave running on the same platform as the attester.
• What is its identity? To address this question, Intel SGX
adopts two types of identities: (1) the enclave identity,
i.e., the enclave measurement (MRENCLAVE), which is
the cryptographic hash of the initial code and data of an
enclave, and thus is used to identity the enclave’s contents.
The enclave measurement is calculated by the hardware
when loading enclave code and data during enclave cre-
ation. Hence, the integrity of the enclave measurement is
thus protected by the hardware; (2) the sealing identity
(MRSIGNER), which is the cryptographic hash of a public
RSA key that identifies the enclave’s developer. Both identi-
ties are included in quotes. Hence, the attestee could obtain
the attester’s identities at the same time when verifying the
quotes.
• Is the identity trusted? After the attestee is convinced
that it is communicating with a real enclave with its
specific identities MRENCLAVE and MRSIGNER, it is solely
the attestee’s decision whether an enclave with the given
MRENCLAVE and/or MRSIGNER can be trusted. Note that
a user of an enclave is not necessarily the developer of
the enclave. For example, in the cases of running smart
contracts or microservices in enclaves [26], [27], the users
and the developers are different parties. If the user chooses
to trust a developer, any enclave signed by the developer
will be trusted. This is clearly not intended in cases
where the users and the developers are separate parties.
In this paper, we consider a trust model where enclaves
are trusted by their measurements (MRENCLAVE), not their
developers (MRSIGNER). Hence, the attestee needs to hold
the measurement of a trusted attester in advance, so that
the verification can be carried out easily. Particularly,
when the attestee is also an enclave, the trusted attester’s
measurement will be hardcoded into its own initial enclave
data [28], [29], [30].
Mutual attestation. Note that the aforementioned trust estab-
lishment is unidirectional, i.e., from an attester to an attestee.
When the attestee is also an enclave, mutual attestation may be
necessary. Mutual attestation is a mechanism that allows the
communicating enclaves to attest each other and then establish
a trust relationship. This is necessary, for example, in the
following scenarios:
• Two enclaves from different developers running on the
same machine authenticate each other. They trust less the
reputation of the other developer, but the enclave identity
of each other (after inspecting their code).
• An enclave running in a web server provisions secrets to an
enclave running in the client’s browser, while neither the
web server nor the browser is trusted by the enclaves [31].
• When data needs to be exchanged between SGX-enhanced
privacy-preserving blockchains [32], [27], [26], [33], an
enclave from one blockchain needs to first attest the identity
of another enclave from a different blockchain.
Mutual attestation without trusted third parties (TTP).
Mutual attestation can be achieved by simply performing
attestation twice, one per each direction, by a trusted user. The
user may also delegate this effort to a trusted third party (TTP).
A TTP could be a stand-alone server that performs remote
attestation with each enclave, validates the results (in collabo-
ration with Intel’s attestation services), and exchanges secrets
with the two enclaves as a middle man to bootstrap the trust.
However, integrating a user or a TTP into the application’s
operation dramatically increases the trusted computing base
(TCB) of the entire application. The security of the application
will hinge upon the trustworthiness of the software stack of
the user or the TTP, rather than solely the security of the
enclave code itself (and, of course, that of the CPU hardware).
Therefore, it is often desired to perform mutual attestation
without TTPs.
In this paper, we aim to provide a mechanism for a group
of (two or more) enclaves to mutually attest one another
by their enclave identity. However, we found this problem
non-trivial. Consider the cases of mutual attestation with two
enclaves that would establish mutual trust with each other. The
difficulty to do so lies in that both enclaves need to wait for the
other enclave’s measurements to be finalized before they could
include them in their initial data to finalize their measurements
and release them. The situation has some similarity to the
deadlock problem, in that both parties wait on the data held by
each other before they can proceed. To our best knowledge,
no prior work has addressed this problem.
Our solution: MAGE. The key challenge of mutual attestation
for a group of enclave without trusted third parties is to enable
each of these enclaves to obtain the measurements of other
enclaves in the same group from its own enclave memory,
so that during the attestation phase, the enclave could verify
whether the measurement of the attester is the same as one of
the trusted enclaves in the same group. As such, we propose
a framework, dubbed MAGE, to allow a group of enclaves
to derive the measurements of other enclaves in the group
from some intermediate states instead of the final outputs of
the other enclaves’ measuring process. The key observation is
that the measurement calculation is deterministic and sequen-
tial. Knowing intermediate states and information to perform
subsequent measuring operations would be sufficient to derive
the final output, i.e., the enclave measurement. When designed
carefully, the problem could be resolved as all enclaves could
generate intermediate states of their measuring processes and
share them with others simultaneously.
Particularly, MAGE adds at the end of each enclave an
extra data segment with the same content which includes
the intermediate hash value of each trusted enclave’s content
right before the extra data segment. Hence, during runtime,
each enclave knows the intermediate hash value of another
trusted enclave (retrieved from the extra data segment) and the
content left to be added (i.e., the extra data segment), and thus
could derive the that trusted enclave’s measurement. We have
implemented a prototype of MAGE by extending the Intel SGX
SDK. The evaluation suggests that to enable mutual attestation
for up to 85 enclaves, 62 KB enclave memory overhead for
each enclave is introduced and roughly 21.7µs is needed to
derive one measurement. We also plan to open-sourced it on
Github. While the proposed scheme is originally designed for
Intel SGX, the method can be easily extended to different types
of TEEs, e.g., AMD SEV, and even between different types
of TEEs, as long as they adopt similar mechanisms for the
calculation of measurements.
Paper outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Sec. II provides necessary background for this paper. Sec. III
presents motivating scenarios and Sec. IV gives an overview
of the proposed scheme. The main component, the technique
for enclaves to mutually derive each other’s measurements is
presented in Sec. V. We present a prototype implementation
and evaluate the performance in Sec. VI. Sec. VII discusses
improvements and extensions. Sec. VIII presents related works
and Sec. IX concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SGX Memory Organization
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a new hard-
ware feature introduced on recent Intel processors. Intel SGX
provides a shielded execution environment, called enclaves,
to protect sensitive code and data from untrusted system
softwares. Particularly, Intel SGX reserves a specified range
2
Fig. 1. Enclave measurement calculation flow.
of DRAM, called Processor Reserved Memory (PRM), which
will deny accesses from any software (including the operating
system) other than the enclave itself. The enclave’s code, data,
and related data structures are stored in a subset of PRM, called
Enclave Page Cache (EPC), which is further split into 4 KB
EPC pages.
When creating an enclave, the SGX instruction ECREATE
will be called to create the first EPC page, called SGX Enclave
Control Structure (SECS) page, which maintains the metadata
of the enclave to be created, such as the base address, the
size of enclave memory required, and the identity of the
enclave. Then, via the SGX instruction EADD, two types of
EPC pages will be added: (1) Thread Control Structure (TCS)
pages that store information needed for logical processors to
execute enclave code, such as the start address of enclave
code when entering enclave mode via the SGX instruction
EENTER; and (2) regular (REG) pages that store the enclave’s
code, data and other related data structures such as State Save
Area (SSA), which is used to store enclave code’s execution
context during interrupts to protect the execution context from
being learned by the untrusted system software (the processor
will clear the execution context before transferring control to
the interrupt handler and resume the execution context from
the copy in the SSA after the interrupts are resolved and
the enclave’s execution is resumed). Note that when adding
either a TCS page or a REG page, a 64-byte data structure,
called Security Information (SECINFO), is also needed for
the EADD instruction to specify the properties of the added
EPC page, such as page type (a TCS page or a REG page),
and access permissions (whether the page can be read, written
and/or executed). After all enclave pages are loaded, the SGX
instruction EINIT will be invoked to finalize the creation of
the enclave. And the enclave code could be run then.
TABLE I. 512-BIT BLOCK UPDATED TO MRENCLAVE BY ECREATE.
Range Content
[63 : 0] 0045544145524345H; // “ECREATE”
[95 : 64] Size of one SSA frame in pages;
[159 : 96] Size of enclave in bytes;
[511 : 160] 0;
TABLE II. 512-BIT BLOCK UPDATED TO MRENCLAVE BY EADD.
Range Content
[63 : 0] 0000000044444145H; // “EADD”
[127 : 64] Offset of the added EPC page, relative
to the enclave base;
[511 : 128] The first 48 bytes of SECINFO;
B. SGX Enclave Measurements
Intel SGX uses enclave measurements to identify enclaves.
Generally, the enclave measurement is the cryptographic hash
of the contents of an enclave, including initial code, data, and
related data structures such as TCSs and SSAs. In this way,
the enclave user could verify the identity of an enclave by
checking only its measurement with an expected value.
In the current Intel SGX design, enclave measurements are
calculated using SHA-256 [34]. SHA-256 is a Secure Hash
Algorithm (SHA) that is used for generating 256-bit digests
of messages. The generated digests are used to protect the
integrity of the messages. SHA-256 has three algorithms:
• Initialization algorithm initialize 8 32-bit words, called
intermediate hash, before calculating the digest.
• Update algorithm takes a 512-bit block as input at a
time, and updates the intermediate hash using pre-defined
compression functions.
• Finalization algorithm update the intermediate hash with
the last 512-bit block which contains the number of all
bits that have been updated to the intermediate hash,
and produce the final 256-bit digest by concatenating the
resulting 8 32-bit words.
Now we describe how Intel SGX leverages SHA-256 to
calculate enclave measurements. MRENCLAVE is a 256-bit
field located in the SECS page of an enclave. The calculation
of MRENCLAVE is performed along with the creation of the
enclave, as shown in Fig. 1. When ECREATE is called to load
an SECS page, the first page of an enclave, it also initializes
the MRENCLAVE field using SHA-256 Initialization algorithm
and updates its value using SHA-256 Update algorithm takes
as input a 512-bit block, including the metadata of the enclave
such as the size of one SSA frame and the size of the enclave
memory, as shown in Table I.
When EADD is called each time to create an TCS or REG
page, it updates MRENCLAVE with a 512-bit block as shown
in Table II. Note that EADD measures only the metadata of
the page to be added, e.g., its offset and access permissions.
The content of the page is measured by the SGX instruction
EEXTEND. EEXTEND measures 256 bytes at one time. As
depicted in Table III, For each 256 bytes of an EPC page,
EEXTEND performs the SHA-256 Update algorithm 5 times.
The first iteration measures a 512-bit block containing the
metadata of the 256 bytes (2048 bits) of data including its
3
TABLE III. FIVE 512-BIT BLOCKS UPDATED TO MRENCLAVE FOR
MEASURING THE 256-BYTE (2048-BIT) DATA OF AN EPC PAGE BY
EEXTEND.
Range Content
[63 : 0] 00444E4554584545H; // “EEXTEND”
[127 : 64] Offset of the 256 bytes to be measured,
relative to the enclave base;
[511 : 128] 0;
Range Content
[511 : 0] data[511 : 0];
Range Content
[511 : 0] data[1023 : 512];
Range Content
[511 : 0] data[1535 : 1024];
Range Content
[511 : 0] data[2047 : 1536];
offset, and the following 4 iterations each measures 512 bits
of these bytes. To measure a whole EPC page which consists
of 4096 bytes, 16 EEXTEND operations are needed.
The last step of creating an enclave is to call the SGX
instruction EINIT to finalize the measurement using the
finalization algorithm of SHA-256. The finalization algorithm
will update MRENCLAVE the last time with a 512-bit block
containing the total count of bits that have been updated into
MRENCLAVE. This count is initialized during ECREATE and
updated through ECREATE, EADD and EEXTEND.
C. SGX Attestation
For an enclave (attester) to authenticate its identity to
another entity (attestee), Intel SGX provides two types of
attestation mechanisms: local attestation and remote attesta-
tion. Generally, an attestation key will be used to generate
a signature of the attester’s identity along with a piece of
attestation data. When the signature is verified to be valid by
the attestee, it is assured that the attestation data is produced
by the attester who is an enclave with the claimed identity
running on an authentic SGX platform.
1) Local Attestation: Local attestation is introduced to
enable an enclave to attest itself to another enclave located on
the same platform. That is, both the attester and attestee are
enclaves sharing the same processor. Specifically, the attester
enclave calls the SGX instruction EREPORT to generate a
Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) signature of a
data structure, called report, which contains its own measure-
ment and attestation data. Note that the calculation of HMAC
involves a secret called report key. Each report key is bond
to an enclave, as an enclave measurement must be specified
during the derivation of a report key. When calling EREPORT,
the measurement of the target enclave (attestee) must also be
provided. The processor will then derive the report key of the
target enclave, to generate the HMAC. Note that this process
is completely within the processor, and the report key of the
target enclave is not exposed to the enclave memory of the
attester during EREPORT. The only way to obtain the report
key is to call the SGX instruction EGETKEY within the target
enclave. EGETKEY will use the calling enclave’s measurement
to derive the report key. Hence, the report key is shared only
between the target enclave and the SGX implementation. When
a report is received and verified by the target enclave, it
can be convinced that the report is generated by the SGX
implementation on behalf of an attester whose measurement
is also specified in the report.
2) Remote Attestation: To enable an enclave to attest itself
to a remote entity, remote attestation is introduced. Currently,
Intel adopts Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) scheme for remote
attestation. EPID is a digital signature algorithm that could
protect the anonymity of SGX platforms [35]. To facilitate
EPID based remote attestation, Intel introduces two services,
i.e., Intel Provisioning Service (IPS) and Intel Attestation Ser-
vice (IAS), and provides SGX platforms with two privileged
enclaves, Intel-signed Provisioning Enclave (PvE) and Quoting
Enclave (QE). Particularly, Intel Provisioning Service and the
Provisioning Enclave run an EPID provisioning protocol to
provision an EPID private member key (attestation key) to an
SGX platform. The EPID private member key could only be
accessed by the Provisioning Enclave and the Quoting Enclave,
otherwise, any malicious enclave that could access the EPID
private member key will be able to forge valid signatures to
convince the remote entity. Hence, to get a signature signed
by the EPID private member key, the attester enclave needs to
firstly attest itself to the Quoting Enclave via local attestation.
After the Quoting Enclave verifies the attester’s report, it will
generate a data structure, called quote, which contains the
attester’s measurement and attestation data that are copied from
the report and sign the quote using the EPID private member
key. The attestation enclave could then use the signed quote
to attest itself to the remote entity. In the current design, the
signed quote is encrypted by the Quoting Enclave, so that the
remote entity has to forward the encrypted signed quote to
Intel Attestation Service for verification.
In December 2018, Intel introduced an Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) based attestation so-
lution [36]. Particularly, Intel provides a privileged enclave,
called Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), which could
access an ECDSA private key, called Provisioning Certification
Key (PCK), derived from within the SGX processor. Intel
publishes the corresponding public key as an X.509 certificate
for each SGX platform that supports ECDSA attestation.
Hence, any party with the certificate could verify the ECDSA
quote signed by Provisioning Certification Enclave run on the
corresponding SGX platform.
III. MOTIVATING SCENARIOS
In this section, we present a few motivating scenarios,
where mutual attestation of enclaves without trusted third
parties is of great importance.
A. Local Mutual Attestation with Enclave Identity
Consider a case where two SGX enclaves running on
the same machine need to establish mutual trust. Existing
solutions are mainly based on the sealing identity (MRSIGNER)
rather than the enclave identity (MRENCLAVE). Particularly,
two mechanisms, i.e., local attestation and sealing, can be
leveraged to achieve this:
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• Trust via local attestation: As explained in Sec. II, local
attestation can be used by one enclave to attest itself to
another enclave. In the report one enclave sends to another
enclave via local attestation, both the enclave identity
and sealing identity are included. Hence, the enclave that
receives the report could compare only the sealing identity
extracted from the report with the sealing identity of the
trusted enclave, which should be hardcoded in its initial
data in advance. Such local attestation could be run twice
between the two enclaves, once per direction. Both enclaves
need to have the other’s sealing identity hardcoded in
their initial data in advance. Note that this solution works
for enclaves developed either by the same developer or
different developers.
• Trust via sealing: Intel SGX has provided a mechanism
called sealing for secret sharing between enclaves devel-
oped by the same developer that run on the same platform.
Particularly, a seal key can be derived within the enclave
to encrypt and decrypt secrets. During seal key derivation,
the enclave could choose to include the identity of the
developer, i.e., MRSIGNER, instead of MRENCLAVE. In
this way, all enclaves signed by the same developer could
derive the same seal key to decrypt the secret. The secret
could be a shared private key used for establishing a secure
channel. For SGX platforms that support key separation and
sharing [37], a configuration value and extra product IDs
are introduced to further identifies enclaves developed by
the same developer. Note that such sealing based solutions
work only for enclaves developed by the same developer.
However, trusting the enclave developer could dramatically
increase the trusted computing base (TCB). This is because
any enclave built by the same developer shares the same
sealing identity. An outdated, compromised enclave could be
exploited to compromise other enclaves and hence the entire
applications, if the trust between enclaves that established
via their sealing identities. Finer-grain identification provided
by key separation and sharing has the potential to reduce
the attack surface, but its effectiveness is questionable as it
highly relies on the developer’s proper management of these
configurations. On the other hand, when using the enclave
identity during local attestation, only the enclave with the
given measurement will be trusted. Hence, exploring solutions
that enable local mutual attestation with enclave identity could
minimize the TCB that includes only the involved enclaves’
code and data.
B. Remote Attestation for Server-Client Applications
Intel SGX can be adopted in server-client applications to
enhance the security of both the server and the client. In
such scenarios, both the server and the client are equipped
with enclaves that conceal sensitive data and code from the
rest of the software stack, in order to minimize the TCB
to only the SGX hardware and the enclave code. A secure
channel established between the enclave on the client side and
the enclave on the server side is desired to enable two-way
authentication and secret provisioning.
For example, OPERA introduces an attestation service
to provide better privacy guarantees to enclaves [30]. The
proposed attestation service is based on EPID. It has two types
of enclaves: issuing enclaves (IssueE) working as servers
that are responsible to provision EPID private keys to the
other type of enclaves called attestation enclaves (AttestE),
which function as clients. AttestEs then use the provisioned
EPID private key to provide attestation service to local en-
claves. One important property of OPERA is its openness,
i.e., the implementation is completely open, so that its code
(and hence behavior) can be publicly verified and thus is
trustworthy, while its developer/signer (or sealing identity) can
be untrusted. This property enables OPERA to achieve better
security without introducing extra trusted parties. As such, an
enclave identity based mutual attestation is desired in OPERA.
However, due to the lack of an enclave identity based mu-
tual attestation mechanism between the server enclave and the
client enclave, the authors of OPERA provided an alternative
design that transfers part of the attestation workload to the user
of the system. Particularly, only the server enclave verifies the
identity (i.e. the measurement) of the client enclave before
provisioning EPID private keys. The client enclave has no
means to verify whether the provisioned EPID private keys are
from a trusted server enclave or not. The TCB of the server-
client applications includes partial code on the user side that
verifies whether the client enclave obtained the EPID private
keys from a trusted server enclave or not. While the authors
proved the secrecy property of the protocol using ProVerif,
they did not discuss other potential threats due to the lack of
mutual attestation. For example, the adversary could provision
the AttestE with an EPID private key controlled by the
adversary and launch co-location attacks on the user of OPERA
by monitoring the error message (e.g., “EPID private key is
from an untrusted server enclave”) of the attestation results.
Hence, designing mutual attestation mechanism for server-
client applications could reduce the attack surface and make
the applications more self-contained.
C. Remote Attestation for Decentralized Applications
Intel SGX has also been advocated as an enabling tech-
nology for privacy-preserving decentralized applications. The
security of many decentralized applications, like Bitcoin’s
blockchain network and Tor’s onion routing network, relies
on the distributed trust over a large number of participating
nodes, the majority of which are out of control of the adversary.
SGX provides solutions to removing such trust completely
from these participating nodes, protecting both the integrity
and confidentiality of the secrets from these untrusted entities.
For example, Kim et al. proposed SGX-Tor that utilizes SGX
to enhance Tor [38]. With SGX’s strong confidentiality and
integrity guarantees, SGX-Tor addresses some limitations of
original Tor networks, e.g., weakening the threat model and
mitigating low resource attacks.
Moreover, designs that use SGX to provide privacy-
preserving smart contracts have been proposed, such as Eki-
den [26] and FastKitten [27], with different focuses. Ekiden
provides efficient off-chain execution of single-round con-
tracts, while FastKitten targets efficient off-chain execution
of reactive multi-round contracts. Hence, it is conceivable for
one smart contract to delegate part of its execution to another
smart contract that is more efficient in handling it. Establishing
secure channels between the enclaves of these smart contracts
requires mutual attestation and trusted third parties are un-
desired. Furthermore, as blockchain interoperability, i.e., the
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ability to share data across different blockchain networks, is
becoming more and more important for applications such as
health care and voting, enabling these enclaves to mutually
attest each other will be a fundamental problem to solve. Each
enclave should be able the attest the other’s identity before
accepting the transaction executed by that enclave.
IV. OVERVIEW
In this section, we describe the problem we aim to address,
the threat model we assume, and the overall workflow of
MAGE.
A. Problem Formulation
In this paper, we aim to address the problem of enabling
a group of enclaves to mutually attest one another without
trusted third parties. These enclaves could be developed by
the same developer or multiple different developers, and the
interaction between them are also specified by the code.
These enclaves could be run on the same SGX platform (i.e.,
machine) or different SGX platforms; they need to mutually
attest each other before they could start to interact and/or
collaborate.
Intel SGX provides two types of attestation, i.e., local
attestation and remote attestation. Both enable one enclave to
verify that it is communicating with an actual enclave whose
identity, i.e., the measurement, is in the received report (for
local attestation) or quote (for remote attestation).
Hence, the key challenge of mutual attestation is for each
enclave to obtain the identities, i.e., measurements of the other
trusted enclaves, without the help of trusted third parties.
Consider a minimal group of two enclaves, i.e., Encl1 and
Encl2. For Encl1 to verify an attester enclave is actually
the other enclave Encl2 in the group, Encl1 has to know
the measurement of Encl2 in advance. Without a trusted third
party to input Encl2’s measurement into Encl1, Encl1 has
to derive Encl2’s measurement by itself, e.g., by hard-coding
Encl2’s measurement in its enclave memory. For mutual
attestation, Encl2 also needs to be able to derive Encl1’s
measurement.
Simply hard-coding the other enclave’s measurement in the
enclave memory is not feasible. If we first hard-code enclave,
say Encl1’s measurement into the other enclave Encl2’s
initial data. Then we get the measurement of Encl2 and
try to hard-code it into Encl1’s initial data. However, this
will change Encl1’s measurement. The previously hard-coded
Encl1’s measurement in Encl2’s initial data will become
incorrect. Observing that the measurement calculation is de-
terministic and sequential, we consider methods to derive the
final measurement from the intermediate states and information
required for the subsequent calculation. We now define the
problem more formally as follows.
Consider a group of N mutually trusted enclaves, Encl1,
Encl2, . . . , EnclN. Denote the original content (code and
data) of Encli (i = 1, . . . , N ) as Ci. The measurement of an
enclave with content C is the cryptographic hash of its content,
denoted as H(C), where H is a cryptographic hash function.
Definition 1: A mechanism for mutual measurement
derivation consists of two functions (G, F ):
• G is called auxiliary content generation function that is
used to generate auxiliary content needed for deriving
measurements of other enclaves. It takes as input an index
i (= 1, . . . , N ) and the original contents of all N enclaves,
i.e., C1, . . . , CN , and output auxiliary content for Encli,
denoted as Ai = G(i, C1, . . . , CN ). The content of Encli
then becomes the concatenation of Ci and Ai, denoted as
Ci||Ai. Its measurement becomes H(Ci||Ai).
• F is called measurement derivation function that is used for
deriving measurements from the auxiliary content. It takes
as input the auxiliary content Ai of Encli (i = 1, . . . , N )
and an index j (= 1, . . . , N ), and output the measurement
of Enclj. Specifically, F satisfies
F(Ai, j) = H(Cj ||Aj), ∀i, j = 1, . . . , N (1)
Note that in actual enclaves the layout of Ci and Ai might
be interleaved instead of simple concatenation, we will discuss
how to handle such situations in Sec. VII.
B. Threat Model
We assume the hardware implementation of SGX is secure.
That is, a malicious operating system cannot breach the con-
fidentiality and integrity of the enclave code and data. At the
time of writing, with proper microcode patches, known spec-
ulative execution attacks, such as Foreshadow [39], SgxPec-
ture [40] and Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) [41],
[42], [43], can no longer compromise the confidentiality of
SGX enclaves. Moreover, Intel Attestation Service already
provides the enclave users with information of SGX plat-
form’s microcode version (i.e., CPUSVN) and whether Hyper-
Threading is disabled (for mitigating Foreshadow and MDS).
Therefore, the attestation results could indicate whether the
SGX platform is secure against speculative execution attacks.
We assume the code running inside of the enclaves is secure
against memory corruption attacks [44], [45], [46] and access-
pattern-driven micro-architectural side channel attacks [47],
[48], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55]. To securely use
SGX, software programs must be thoroughly examined to be
free of such vulnerabilities [56], [57].
However, we assume SGX platforms are not trusted and
may be controlled by the adversary. Specifically, the adversary
controls all software components outside the enclave, including
the operating system, the virtual machine manager (if any),
the code running in the System Management Mode, etc. The
adversary is also able to launch any enclave as she wants;
however, she cannot create an enclave whose measurement
is pre-specified. Moreover, the adversary can perform man-
in-the-middle attacks against the communication protocols
between the enclaves, including but not limited to intercept-
ing, dropping, replaying communications between any two
enclaves.
This paper considers a group of trusted enclaves that
would like to establish mutual trust between each other before
communicating sensitive data among them. These enclaves
are trusted by their measurements (MRENCLAVE) rather than
their developers (MRSIGNER). The goal of the adversary is to
gain the trust of the trusted enclaves via a malicious (enclave)
program and earn the sensitive data.
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C. Workflow of MAGE
We now describe the workflow of MAGE, a framework
enabling mutual attestation for a group of enclaves without
trusted third parties, given a mechanism for mutual measure-
ment derivation.
1) Develop a system including a group of enclaves that
need to interact or collaborate with each other;
2) During compilation, derive auxiliary content from
these enclaves and update each enclave with the
derived auxiliary content;
3) During runtime, enclaves derive the measurements to
be used in either local attestation or remote attesta-
tion.
For the first step, a group of trusted enclaves that need to
establish mutual trust are developed, especially when sensitive
data needs to be transferred from one enclave to another.
These enclaves could be developed by one or multiple de-
velopers. The algorithms about how the transferred secrets
will be processed are up to the enclave developers, thus out
of scope of this paper. The protocols for establishing secure
channels include local attestation and/or remote attestation[58],
[59]. MAGE will provide application programming interfaces
(APIs) that implement a measurement derivation function F
to be included in the attestation flows within the enclaves.
The missing components are the auxiliary contents of other
enclaves in the group to be used by the measurement derivation
function to derive measurements of other enclaves.
Then, during compilation, a tool provided by MAGE, that
implements the corresponding auxiliary content generation
function G will be leveraged to extract auxiliary contents from
these enclaves, and augment these enclaves with the derived
auxiliary contents. After the augmentation, each enclave is
ready to be signed by the developers and released.
Lastly, during runtime, whenever the measurement of a
particular enclave in the group is needed, the measurement
derivation API will be called to derive the measurement from
the corresponding auxiliary content inserted earlier.
Note that most part of the workflow could fulfilled using
existing SDKs and protocols. The missing and most critical
component is the mechanism for mutual measurement deriva-
tion, i.e., the auxiliary content generation function G and the
measurement derivation function F .
V. MAGE DESIGN
In this section, we introduce the mechanisms of MAGE. We
will start with a minimal group of two enclaves and describe
the necessary modifications needed for the enclave and the way
to derive the other enclave’s measurement. Then we discuss
extension from two enclaves to a group of enclaves.
A. Measurement Derivation from Intermediate Hash
Now, we introduce another method for deriving measure-
ments of enclaves with different contents. The key observation
is that a measurement, which is the cryptographic hash of an
enclave’s code and data, is calculated deterministically and
sequentially. Setting aside the initialization and finalization
phases, the hash of the concatenation of two messages X and
Y , denoted as X ||Y , is calculating the hash of X first, and
then calculating the hash of the concatenation of the resulting
H(X) and Y . That is
H(X ||Y ) = H(H(X)||Y ) (2)
When it comes to the enclave Encli (i = 1, 2, . . . , N )
with content Ci||Ai. With any value set for the auxiliary
content Ai, the calculation of the measurement satisfies the
following equation:
H(Ci||Ai) = H(H(Ci)||Ai), ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N (3)
Hence, we propose to include H(Ci) into the auxiliary
content so that the measurement derivation could start from it.
Specifically, we define an auxiliary content generation function
G as
G(i, C1, C2, . . . , CN ) = H(C1)||H(C2)|| . . . ||H(CN ) (4)
Note that the output G is irrelevant with regards to i, so the
auxiliary contents of all these N enclaves are the same, i.e.,
Ai = Aj , i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N . Let Ai,j represents the j-th hash
value in Ai, which is H(Cj). We now define the measurement
derivation function F as follows:
F(Ai, j) = H(Ai,j ||Ai) = H(H(Cj)||Aj)
= H(Cj ||Aj), ∀i, j = 1, . . . , N
The above equation abstracted away details of actual SHA-
256 algorithms used in SGX. As described in Sec. II-B, for
an actual enclave, given any intermediate hash value during
the measurement calculation process, when the information
of all the remaining enclave pages to be added are provided,
the enclave measurement can be derived by carrying out the
subsequent SHA-256 update and finalization operations from
the intermediate hash value. For example, if both of Encl1 and
Encl2 know each other’s (1) intermediate hash before the last
page to be added and the number of bits already updated to that
intermediate hash; (2) the content, the offset and the SECINFO
of the last page, they could derive each other’s measurement.
Note that the content of the last page could be read (as-
suming that the access permissions allow read operations) by
the enclave during runtime, we can calculate the intermediate
hash of all pages before the last page in advance, and store
the calculated value in the last page. In this way, both pieces
of information are available during runtime. We will explain
in more details in the following, starting from a group of two
enclaves Encl1 and Encl2.
Remark. There is no additional security risk to expose the
intermediate hash values of these enclaves, as the intermediate
hash values can be computed deterministically by any party
who knows the enclave’s initial code and data.
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Fig. 2. The flow of instrumenting the mutual attestation reserved segment MARS with generated auxiliary content for measurement derivation.
TABLE IV. MAINFO : INFORMATION NEEDED FOR MEASUREMENT
DERIVATION.
Component Description
PREMR The intermediate hash before MARS;
COUNT The number of bytes updated to PREMR;
OFFSET The offset of MARS;
SECINFO The security information of MARS;
B. Compile-Time Auxiliary Content Derivation and Instru-
mentation
Auxiliary content that is required for deriving the other
enclave’s measurement needs to be extracted and hardcoded
into the enclave’s initial data. It should be done during the
enclave development phase. Basically, the Encl1 and Encl2
developers could follow the following steps:
• Encl1 and Encl2 developers reserve a data segment
(called mutual attestation reserved segment, denoted as
MARS) of the same size (e.g., 4 KB, the size of one EPC
page) in the enclave memory, which will be loaded last
during the enclave creation. Note that this data segment
should be aligned to the page boundaries, so that it will
not overlap with other enclave pages during measurement
calculation. The SHA-256 intermediate hash value of all
pages before this reserved region will be calculated. We call
this SHA-256 intermediate hash value pre-measurement,
denoted as PREMR.
• Encl1 and Encl2 developers exchange information
needed for derive their own measurements, called Mutual
Attestation Information (MAINFO) as depicted in Table IV.
Particular, MAINFO contains three fields: (1) the pre-
measurement PREMRi of Encli, (2) the number of bytes
updated to PREMRi, (3) the offset of the reserved data
segment MARSi, and (4) the security information of MARSi.
The former two are used to reconstruct the state of measure-
ment calculation before updating the reserved data segment
MARSi, and the latter two are needed for updating the
MARSi into the hash value as described in Sec. II-B. Note
that SECINFO field can be dropped if the developers agree
on the same SECINFO, e.g., assuming MARS contains only
read-only data pages. While fixing the offset of MARS could
also save the memory space for the OFFSET field, it will
add extra workload for enclave developers to adjust the
enclave memory layouts, which might not be preferred.
• After the exchange, Encl1 and Encl2 developers organize
the MAINFOs of both enclaves in the same order and
instrument them into the MARS of their own enclaves so
that each enclave knows the MAINFO of the other enclave
(from its own MARS) and the content of the other enclave’s
MARS (same as its own MARS).
C. Runtime Measurement Derivation
As described in Sec. II-B, the calculation of enclave
measurements depends on the order the enclave pages are
created. Even with exactly the same enclave code and data,
when loaded in different orders, different measurements will
be generated. Hence, during enclave creation, EPC pages of
Encl1 and Encl2 have to be in a particular order that can
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Fig. 3. Runtime measurement derivation.
be simulated during runtime to derive their measurements, as
shown in Fig. 2. Particularly, all enclave pages except MARSs
need to be created in the same order that generates the pre-
measurement, PREMR. The MARS is created and loaded last.
The enclave is initialized afterward. We will describe how to
adjust the order of loading enclave pages in Sec. VI when
needed, and also discuss an alternative design when the loading
order cannot be altered. Now we assume the enclave is loaded
exactly in the same order as how the PREMR is computed.
After one enclave, e.g., Encl1, is created, it could derive
the measurement of the other enclave (Encl2) as shown in
Fig. 3:
• From Encl1’s reserved data segment MARS1, Encl1 re-
trieves Encl2’s pre-measurement PREMR2, the number of
bytes updated PREMR2, the offset of Encl2’s reserved data
segment MARS2, and the SECINFO of MARS2.
• Encl1 simulates Encl2’s process of loading the reserved
data segment MARS2. Note that the content of MARS2 is
the same as MARS1 where Encl1 could access directly.
Encl1 then update the number of bytes contributing to
the resulting SHA-256 intermediate hash and perform the
finalization operation to obtain the measurement of Encl2.
For verification, let’s recall how Encl2’s measurement is
actually generated by the SGX implementation: SHA-256
intermediate hash is updated as Encl2’s pages are created one
by one; when it comes to MARS2 which will be loaded last, the
SHA-256 intermediate hash is PREMR2, assuming the correct
loading order; the SHA-256 intermediate hash keeps being
updated when loading MARS2 and gets finalized afterward.
Hence, what Encl1 derives is exactly the measurement of
Encl2. Similarly, Encl2 could also derive Encl1’s measure-
ment.
D. Supporting Multiple Enclaves
Now we describe how to extend the method presented
above to a group of (more than two) enclaves, Encl1,
Encl2,. . . , EnclN. Enclave developers need to extract and
exchange the MAINFOs from their own enclaves. Then they
organize the MAINFOs of all enclave in the same manner to
generate identical MARSs. And the creation of these enclaves
Algorithm 1: Measurement Derivation Function
Input: idx
Output: mrenclave
1 if idx ≥ total number of MAINFO entries in MARS then
2 return NULL;
3 [PREMR, COUNT, OFFSET, SECINFO] ← idx-th
MAINFO in MARS;
4 sha handle ← sgx sha256 init();
5 replace fields of sha handle with PREMR and COUNT;
6 for page in MARS do
7 sgx sha256 update(sha handle,
“EADD”‖OFFSET‖SECINFO);
8 for every 2048-bit data in page do
9 sgx sha256 update(sha handle,
“EEXTEND”‖OFFSET);
10 sgx sha256 update(sha handle,data[511:0]);
11 sgx sha256 update(sha handle,data[1023:512]);
12 sgx sha256 update(sha handle,data[1535:1024]);
13 sgx sha256 update(sha handle,data[2047:1536]);
14 OFFSET = OFFSET + 256;
15 mrenclave ← sgx sha256 get hash(sha handle);
16 return mrenclave;
needs to follow the pre-defined order for calculation PREMRs.
After one enclave is created, it could derive the measurement
of any enclave by fetching the corresponding MAINFO from its
own MARS and simulating the measurement process with the
content of its own MARS. The measurement derivation function
is shown in Algorithm 1. It takes as input the index idx of the
enclave measurement to be derived, and outputs the derived en-
clave measurement. The function retrieves the idx-th MAINFO
to create an SHA-256 handle, update it with the content
of MARS following the process described in Sec. II-B. Note
that sgx_sha256_init(), sgx_sha256_update()
and sgx_sha256_get_hash() are the implementations of
the initialization, update and finalization algorithms inside the
enclave.
This solution is more scalable than the first one, as the
overhead of adding one enclave is including only its MAINFO
in MARS. However, the scalability is still restricted by the max-
imum size of memory an enclave could have. To support even
higher scalability requirements, we will discuss an alternative
design when extra untrusted storage is available in Sec. VII.
E. Case Studies
We now give a simple example of mutual attestation for
migrating secrets from one enclave (Encl1) to another enclave
(Encl2). Considering secret migration could happen locally
on the client’s own computer with SGX support, we take local
attestation as example to describe how to leverage MAGE to
achieve secure secret migration.
Fig. 4 describes the workflow of establishing a secure
channel (deriving a shared Diffie-Hellman key) for secret
migration between two enclaves via local attestation:
1) After receiving a secret migration request from the
client of both enclaves, Encl1 generates a Diffie-
Hellman private/public key pair (a, ga) and a nonce,
9
Fig. 4. Establishing a secure channel for secret migration between two
enclaves via local attestation.
and sends the public key ga and the nonce to Encl2
via local attestation. Particularly, Encl1 derives the
measurement of Encl2 using the technique described
in Sec. V and calls EREPORT to produce a report
with the derived measurement as the target enclave
measurement and the hash of ga and the nonce as
the report data. ga, the nonce and the report is sent
to Encl2.
2) After receiving the public key ga, the nonce and the
associated report, Encl2 first verifies the identity of
the sender by deriving the measurement of Encl1
and comparing it with the one in the report structure,
and then verifies the integrity of ga by calculating the
hash of the received ga and the nonce, and comparing
it with the hash in the report data. If verified valid,
Encl2 also generates a Diffie-Hellman private/public
key pair (b, gb), and sends the public key gb to
Encl1 via local attestation. Similarly, a report with
the hash of both public keys and the nonce as report
data and Encl1’s measurement as the target enclave
measurement, along with the public key gb is sent to
Encl1.
3) Upon receiving gb and the corresponding report,
Encl1 verifies the identity of the sender and derives
shared Diffie-Hellman key as gab = (ga)b. Hence, a
secure channel between Encl1 and Encl2 is cre-
ated. Encl1 then encrypts the secrets to be migrated
using gab and sends the encrypted results to Encl2.
4) Encl2 could then decrypt the secrets. Optionally,
Encl2 might send back an acknowledgement mes-
sage encrypted by gab, telling Encl1 that the secrets
are received and the copies on Encl1’s side could
now be removed.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we describe our prototype implementation
of MAGE and evaluate its runtime performance overhead and
memory overhead.
A. Implementation
MAGE is implemented by extending the Intel SGX SDK
(version 2.6.100.51363) [60]. Specifically, it consists of three
components: (1) a SDK library that reserves a data segment for
MARS and APIs to support derivation of measurements from
MAINFOs located in MARS; (2) a modified enclave loader that
loads MARSs last when creating enclaves; (3) modified signing
tool that extracts MAINFO from an enclave and fills the MARS
of an enclave with a list of extracted MAINFOs.
1) MAGE Library: libsgx_mage is implemented to
facilitate enclave developers to use MAGE. When included
in an enclave, it reserves a read-only data section, named
.sgx_mage, to be used as MARS. The range of the
.sgx_mage section is aligned to page boundaries, i.e., 4KB.
So its size is a multiple of the page size, i.e., 4KB. Besides
reserving the .sgx_mage section, libsgx_mage provides
two APIs:
• sgx_mage_size() examines the .sgx_mage sec-
tion and returns the total number of MAINFOs in it.
• sgx_mage_gen_measurement() takes as input
an index of the enclave whose measurement is re-
quested and outputs the resulting measurement. Par-
ticularly, it retrieves from the .sgx_mage section the
corresponding MAINFO specified by the index and cal-
culates the final measurement following Algorithm 1.
2) Modified Enclave Loader: The original enclave loader
in Intel SGX SDK loads enclave code and data pages first and
then the TCS pages. Hence, the .sgx_mage section, as a
data segment, will not be loaded last by default. To address
this, we modified the enclave loader to load the enclave pages
in two stages:
• First, the modified enclave loader follows the original
loading process except that when an .sgx_mage sec-
tion is encountered, it skips the .sgx_mage section.
Note that libsgx_mage APIs are located in code
pages and loaded along with the original enclave code
pages.
• Second, when all other pages, including enclave code
and data pages and the TCS pages, are loaded,
the modified enclave loader checks whether there
is an .sgx_mage section, and loads pages in the
.sgx_mage section if found.
Note that if no .sgx_mage section is present, the mod-
ified enclave loader will load the enclave in the same or-
der as the unmodified enclave loader, producing the same
measurement. When there exists an .sgx_mage section,
the modified and unmodified enclave loaders will produce
different measurements due to the different loading order,
as the unmodified enclave loaders will load .sgx_mage
section earlier than the modified one. Since our implemen-
tation of sgx_mage_gen_measurement() produces the
measurement in the same order as the modified enclave loader,
platforms running the enclaves developed with MAGE need to
use to the modified enclave loader. If using modified loader
is undesired, we provide an alternative design that works
with unmodified enclave loaders. Details will be discussed in
Sec. VII.
3) Modified Signing Tool: The original signing tool is
provided by Intel SGX SDK for enclave developers to sign
enclaves, so that they can be accepted by the Intel-signed
Launch Enclave and thus be launched successfully. The signing
tool simulates the loading process of the enclave to calculate
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Fig. 5. Workflow of enclave development using MAGE.
the measurement before signing it. We modified the signing
tool to provide the following two functionalities:
• Deriving MAINFOs: given an enclave developed with
MAGE, the modified signing tool could simulate the
first stage of the modified enclave loader, which loads
all pages except for the .sgx_mage section, to gener-
ate MAINFO, which includes the SHA-256 intermedi-
ate hash, i.e., the PREMR, the number of bytes updated
to PREMR, and the offset of the .sgx_mage section.
The SECINFO is not included as our prototype imple-
mentation adopts a constant value of SECINFO with
access permissions set to be read-only.
• Filling the .sgx_mage section: given an enclave
developed with MAGE and a set of MAINFOs derived
from the group of trusted enclaves, the modified
signing tool could fill the .sgx_mage section with
the list of MAINFOs. The measurement of the in-
strumented enclave will be re-calculated and signed
afterward.
As such, the workflow of enclave development using
MAGE (as shown in Fig. 5) can be depicted as follows: ➊ the
enclave developers independently implement their own enclave
with the libsgx_mage library, and then use the modified
signing tools to derive the MAINFO of their enclaves. ➋ the
enclave developers share their enclaves with one another, so
that they could validate the trustworthiness of the enclaves
from other developers, and then use the modified signing tools
to derive the MAINFOs of them. ➌ with the same list of
MAINFOs, the enclave developers use the modified signing
tool to fill the .sgx_mage section of their enclaves, and then
sign their enclaves before publishing them.
B. Evaluation
Now we describe the evaluation of our prototype im-
plementation of MAGE. Results are measured on a Lenovo
Thinkpad X1 Carbon (4-th Gen) laptop with an Intel Core
i5-6200U processor and 8GB memory.
Since the results are highly related to the size of the
.sgx_mage section, so we evaluate the metrics with regards
to different sizes of the .sgx_mage section.
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Fig. 6. Measurement derivation efficiency.
1) The Number of MAINFOs Supported: We first calculate
the number of MAINFOs that can be stored in an .sgx_mage
section with L bytes (L is a multiple of page size, i.e.,
4KB). The content of an .sgx_mage section is organized
as a structure as follows: the first 8 bytes hold the total
number of MAINFOs and the rest is used to store the content
of these MAINFOs. Each MAINFO takes 48 bytes (32-byte
PREMR, 8-byte COUNT, and 8-byte OFFSET). SECINFO is
not included as we use a constant SECINFO in our prototype
implementation. Hence, ⌊L−8
48
⌋ MAINFOs can be supported.
For example, an .sgx_mage section of one page size could
support up to 85 MAINFOs. On the other hand, to support N
MAINFOs, a total of ⌈ 48N+8
4096
⌉ pages are needed. For example,
supporting N = 10, 000 MAINFOs requires an .sgx_mage
section of = 118 pages (472 KB).
Note that the number of MAINFOs supported can be
slightly increased when the ranges of COUNT and OFFSET
are restricted. For example, SGX v1 has a limit of maximum
enclave memory range for one enclave, which is 128 MB.
Hence, any offset within the enclave can be represented using
27 bits. Since the .sgx_mage section is aligned to page
boundaries, 27 − 12 = 15 bits are enough to store the offset
of an .sgx_mage section. As for COUNT, loading one page
could take up to 81 SHA-256 updates including 1 EADD
(consists of 1 update) and 16 EEXTEND (each includes 5
updates). Hence, 15 + 7 = 22 bits are enough for COUNT. 5
bytes (40 bits) are enough to hold both OFFSET and COUNT.
So one MAINFO can be as small as 32 + 5 = 37 bytes so
that an .sgx_mage section of one page size could hold 110
MAINFOs instead of 85.
2) Efficiency of Measurement Derivation: We then measure
the time needed for deriving one measurement. From the
measurement derivation function described in Algorithm 1, we
can see that the time needed for the derivation is independent
of the size of the original content of the enclave and the actual
number of MAINFOs in the .sgx_mage section. This is
because the content is updated into a single MAINFO where the
derivation process starts from and all bytes in the .sgx_mage
section need to be updated into the final measurement.
So we evaluated the efficiency of measurement deriva-
tion using a dummy enclave with only one enclave func-
tion that calls sgx_mage_gen_measurement() to derive
one measurement from its .sgx_mage section. Also, only
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TABLE V. MEMORY OVERHEAD OF MAGE
# of pages in .sgx_mage 1 10 100 1000 10000
Size of .sgx_mage (KB) 4 40 400 4000 40000
Memory overhead (KB) 62 98 458 4058 40058
one MAINFO from itself is generated and inserted into its
.sgx_mage section. As expected, we verified that the de-
rived measurement is the same as its own measurement. We
measured the time (averaged from 10000 iterations) needed to
run one invocation of sgx_mage_gen_measurement()
when the number of pages in the .sgx_mage section ranges
from 1 to 10000. The results are shown in Fig. 6. When the
.sgx_mage section has a size of a single page, the time
for deriving one measurement is around 2.17e−5 seconds
or 21.7µs. The time needed for deriving one measurement
increases almost linearly with regards to the number of pages
in the .sgx_mage section, because the main operations are
updating the intermediate hash value using the content of
.sgx_mage section.
3) Memory Overhead: The memory overhead introduced
by MAGE includes two components: (1) extra data pages
for MARS; (2) extra code pages related to the measurement
derivation. The first part is straight forward, which is the size
of the .sgx_mage section. To calculate the second part,
we created another enclave similar to the dummy enclave
we just developed, except that the MAGE-related code and
data are removed. We calculated the differences of memory
sizes between these two enclaves. The results are presented in
Table V. Subtracting the first component from the total extra
memory, we got the size of the second component, which is
around 58 KB. Since libsgx_mage leverages the SHA-256
implementations provided in the Intel SGX SDK, the second
component could be smaller if the original enclave already
includes them.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss possible extension of MAGE and
its potential application to TEEs other than SGX.
A. Extending MAGE with Untrusted Storage
The basic design of MAGE enables the derivation of
measurements from information completely inside the enclave
memory. Next, we discuss how MAGE can be extended with
untrusted storage outside the enclaves (e.g., unencrypted mem-
ory, hard drives, etc.).
1) Supporting Unmodified Enclave Loaders: In our basic
design, we modified the enclave loaders to rearrange the order
of enclave pages to be loaded in a way that the MARS is
loaded after all other contents. The libsgx_mage and the
signing tool are modified to calculate measurements following
the same order. While the libsgx_mage and the signing tool
are used by enclave developers, the enclave loader runs on
every SGX platform. Therefore, all parties must upgrade their
toolchain to support MAGE. While we are discussing with Intel
teams to merge MAGE into the official SDK, we next provide
a temporary solution to support MAGE without the need of
modifying enclave loaders and other SDK packages.
Fig. 7. Alternative design for better scalability.
Consider the content of the enclave Ci is split into two
parts: C
pre
i is the part loaded before Ai, and C
post
i is the part
loaded after Ai. The measurement can be calculated as
H(Cprei ||Ai||C
post
i ) = H(H(C
pre
i )||Ai||C
post
i )
We can still insert the intermediate hash of all pages before
Ai, i.e., H(C
pre
i ) into Ai. As for C
post
i , instead of storing
all its content within Ai, which introduces too much memory
overhead, storing only the hash digest of C
post
i within Ai is
more affordable. The auxiliary content generation function can
be defined as
G(i, (Cpre1 , C
post
1 ), . . . , (C
pre
N , C
post
N ))
=H(Cpre1 )||H(C
post
1 )|| . . . ||H(C
pre
N )||H(C
post
N )
During runtime, the enclave issues OCalls to request the
host program to provide the content of C
post
i for measurement
derivation. The hash value H(Cposti ) stored in Ai will be
used to verify the integrity of C
post
i . Then, the measurement
derivation function could start from H(Cprei ) and update the
content of Ai and C
post
i into the intermediate hash to obtain
the final measurement. This design requires extra untrusted
storage to store C
post
i , which unfortunately may take longer
time to derive a measurement when C
post
i is large.
2) Increasing Scalability: In our basic design, the time
cost for measurement derivation and memory overhead grows
linearly with regards to the size of the group of trusted
enclaves. This would be a problem when the group becomes
much larger. Especially, SGX v1 has a limit on the maximum
size of enclave memory. To support a large number of enclaves,
when untrusted storage outside the enclave is available, all
MAINFOs can be moved out of the enclave memory and only
the hash of all these MAINFOs is stored within the MARS
for integrity protection. During measurement derivation, the
target MAINFO will be retrieved from the untrusted storage
and authenticated within the enclave. In this way, the memory
overhead becomes constant, as only one page of MARS is
needed to hold the hash value of all MAINFOs. The time
cost for measurement derivation will also become constant
as only one page of MARS is required to be updated to the
measurement.
However, since MAINFOs are stored in untrusted storage,
the overhead for the MAINFO retrieval and integrity verifica-
tion might still have a linear time complexity when sequential
hashing algorithm such as SHA-256 is used. To address this,
as shown in Fig. 7, the Merkle tree structure could be adopted
to organize MAINFOs outside then enclave memory (only
root hash of the Merkle tree is stored within the MARS) for
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Fig. 8. Privacy-Preserving Pandemic Tracking System.
efficient retrieval and verification, achieving a logarithmic time
complexity instead of a linear time complexity [61].
B. Extensions to Other TEEs
MAGE can be extended to other TEEs that use hash-based
measurement mechanisms for attestation. For example, AMD’s
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a TEE solution that
encrypts the memory of virtual machines (VM) without a
trusted hypervisor. SEV also uses SHA-256 digest of the guest
memory to compute the measurements of guest VMs [62].
Moreover, Sanctum is an open source RISC-V based TEE
solution that offers similar promises as Intel SGX, which
also adopts a measurement mechanism similar to SGX [63].
These TEEs could be integrated with MAGE to enable mutual
attestation without TTP. While ARM TrustZone does not
provide integrity measurement inherently, Zhao et al. proposed
a software-based to provide secure enclaves using TEE such
as ARM TrustZone [64]. The proposed scheme also includes a
hash-based measurement. Hence, MAGE can also be applied.
Further, MAGE can be extended for different types of TEEs
to mutually attest each other. This could benefit applications
that integrate different types of TEEs. For example, as shown
in Fig. 8, a privacy-preserving pandemic tracking system
could be possible when mobile devices with ARM TrustZone
are used to collect and transmit users’ trajectories to cloud
platforms with Intel SGX via a secure channel established
through mutual attestation. The collected trajectories could be
monitored and analyzed privately within enclaves, and notifi-
cations would be returned to those affected mobile users. We
expect mutual attestation between SGX and Trustzone would
enable many other interesting use cases with cloud/client and
edge/client computing models.
C. Supporting Enclave Updates
Although it is possible for the enclave code to be updated
after they are deployed, for reasons like fixing bugs or intro-
ducing new functionalities, MAGE does not support enclave
updates. If the content of any of the enclaves is changed, to
continue the use of MAGE, all other enclave binaries need to
be updated to reflect the change, before these enclaves are
re-deployed in the system.
The lack of support of enclave updates in MAGE is
intended. This is because updates of enclave code change not
only the identity of the enclave (MRENCLAVE) but also the
trustworthiness of its behavior, especially when the developers
are not trusted, which is assumed in our model. Therefore, a
new version of an enclave should be inspected again for its
trustworthiness. In other words, the trust relationship between
these enclaves should be re-evaluated if one has been updated.
We note that enclave applications are similar to dApps built
atop smart contracts, which are also difficult to patch once
deployed. Therefore, solutions for dApps might also work for
enclave applications. We leave the investigation of facilitating
enclave updates to future work.
VIII. RELATED WORK
The work that is most related to ours is presented by
Greveler et al. [59]. The authors proposed a protocol for
two identical Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) to mutually
attest each other for system cloning. The two identical TPMs
generate the same value of platform configuration register
(PCR), which is cryptographic hash of the software loaded into
the TPM, having the same functionality as the measurement
in Intel SGX. However, this protocol only works when both
entities have the same identity, e.g., PCR or measurement,
so that each entity could simply use its own measurement
for verification. In contrast, our scheme enables enclaves with
different measurements to mutually attest each other, enabling
applications beyond system cloning. Shepherd et al. proposed
a Bi-directional Trust Protocol (BTP) for establishing mutually
trusted channels between two TEEs [58]. But BTP assumed
that both TEEs know the identity of the other, while our work
answers how this assumption could be realized.
Apache Teaclave, an open source universal secure com-
puting platform, address the mutual attestation problem by
relying on third-party auditors [65]. Enclaves will be audited
and then signed by these auditors. The public keys of the
auditors are hardcoded in these enclaves to support mutual
attestation. These auditors are trusted by all involved enclaves
and act as trusted third parties. On the contrary, MAGE tackles
the mutual attestation problem without trusted third parties.
Also related to our work is a line of research on enclave
migration. Park et al. was the first to address this problem
by proposing a new SGX hardware instruction to be used to
produce a live migration key between two SGX platforms for
secure transfer of enclave content [66]. Gu et al. proposed a
software-based solution by augmenting enclaves with a thread
that could run remote attestation to establish a secure channel
with the thread within another identical enclave, and then
perform state transfer [67]. Alder et al. proposed an approach
to migrate the persistent states of enclaves, e.g., sealed data,
which is outside of the enclave memory [68]. And Soriente et
al. designed ReplicaTEE for seamless replication of enclaves
in clouds [69]. While all these designs address secret migration
between enclaves with the same measurement, our technique
could complement them by enabling secret migration between
enclaves with different measurements.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study techniques for a group of enclaves
to mutually attest each other without trusted third parties.
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The main contribution of this paper is the mutual measure-
ment derivation mechanisms, enabling enclaves to derive other
trusted enclaves’ measurements during runtime. We implement
the proposed mechanisms based on Intel SGX SDK and
evaluate the performance. We demonstrate through case studies
that this technique could facilitate new applications that require
mutual trust for interaction and collaboration.
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